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Abstract
A country experiencing a lending boom goes through a period of unusually fast growth in credit.
This paper proposes a theory of lending booms that incorporates two distortions which are prevalent
in emerging markets: the imperfect enforceability of contracts and government bailout guarantees. The
ﬁrst of distortion implies that there may be an underinvestment problem and that shocks are propagated
through their eﬀect on borrower wealth. The second distortion ampliﬁes shocks since it encourages
excessive risk taking and overinvestment. Although they appear to aﬀect borrowing in opposite ways,
the tow distortions do not neutralize each other. They combine to rationalize the gradual buildup of
lending booms, the excess volatility of credit and asset prices and the slow recovery if a lending boom
ends in a ﬁnancial crisis. The interaction also introduces a nonlinearity in the response to shocks. This
explains why most lending booms do not require a large negative shock to end, but rather come to a
’soft landing’. In addition to accounting for the main characteristics of a typical lending boom episode
the model also surprising policy implications.
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and seminar participants at Berkeley, Brown, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and San Francico, Harvard, the IMF,
MIT, Munich, NBER Monetary Economics Conference, Stanford, UCLA and the World Bank.1. Introduction
A country experiencing a lending boom goes through a period of unusually fast growth in credit. Lending
booms occur frequently in emerging markets.1 They are often accompanied by asset price inﬂation and
strong investment growth, especially in traditionally risky sectors.2 In addition, many recent ﬁnancial crises
were preceded by lending booms.3 A large literature now argues that lending booms are the result of
mistaken government policy: the existence of bailout guarantees creates a moral hazard problem that entails
overborrowing, excessive investment and risk taking. The boom inevitably ends when it is realized that
futher guarantees are not credible: a crisis ensues.4
While there is considerable evidence that bailout guarantees are present, the standard account of lending
booms suﬀers from two drawbacks. First, the typical lending boom does not end in a crisis. Around 85% of
booms lead to a soft landing, with credit and asset prices gradually reverting to trend.5 Second, the formal
underpinnings of the standard story derive from the deposit insurance literature, which was developed to
study optimal ﬁnancing and risk taking by competitive banks in developed countries.6 It is thus maintained
that the extent of external ﬁnancing does not aﬀect the cost of capital. This assumption makes gambling
with borrowed money particularly attractive in the existing models. However, it is implausible in the light of
recent evidence on ownership structure in emerging economies. Controlling shareholders typically hold large
stakes, even in large ﬁrms. This not only suggests that external ﬁnance is costly, but also that incentives for
ineﬃcient risk taking may not exist.
This paper develops a theory of lending booms in economies where production is controlled by wealthy
entrepreneurs. We show that, in such economies, soft landings are a natural outcome. In our model,
entrepreneurs hold large stakes in their ﬁrms, because contracts cannot be enforced perfectly. Bailout
guarantees are also present. When deciding on investment and ﬁnancing, entrepreneurs thus trade oﬀ gains
from the subsidy implicit in the guarantee against losses to their own capital. At very low levels of wealth,
there is ineﬃcient underinvestment. As entrepreneurs become richer, the moral hazard problem becomes
more severe, and the boom ‘overheats’: ineﬃcient overinvestment and risk taking occur. However, as net
worth rises even further relative to existing investment opportunities, ineﬃcient and highly risky projects
1Aaron: here cite Pierre, and what else ?
2Aaron: here we need micro evidence, Pomerleano etc.
3Aaron: cite your own empirical stuﬀ here, and Kaminsky etc.
4Aaron: papers are mckinnon pill, corsetti, krugman, dooely and as many imf guys as possible...; also can put burnside et
al but need to put extra snetence
5Aaron: cite Pierre and papers you have with Frank
6cite Kareken wallace, kahn marcus, maybe some newer stuﬀ; also freixas rochest as an overview,
2are foregone: a soft landing occurs.
As one building block of our model, we provide an explicit microeconomic framework to clarify why
ﬁnancing constraints can bind in an economy with bailout guarantees. This is not a foregone conclusion: if
a bailout always occurs in case of default, why should lenders care whether borrowers can commit to repay ?
This argument overlooks the fact that bailout guarantees typically insure lenders only against systemic risk.
A bailout will not occur if just an isolated ﬁrm defaults, especially not a small one. Instead, bailouts happen
only when there is a critical mass of defaults. Collateral then still matters for credit, because lenders have
to guard against idiosyncratic default risk.
In a world with bailout guarantees, entrepreneurs and lenders try to collude to exploit the bailout guaran-
tee. There are two implications for policy. First, while better enforceability of contracts may avoid ineﬃcient
underinvestment early on during a lending boom, it also fosters more ineﬃcient overinvestment as the lending
boom overheats. The reason is that a better contracting technology provides entrepreneurs and lenders with
a more eﬀective tool to exploit the guarantee. This contradicts conventional wisdom that better contract
enforcement should improve the allocation of resources. It follows that institutional changes that improve
contract enforcement may not be desirable unless at the same time a regulatory framework is put in place
that contains excessive risk taking. Second, with systemic guarantees, there can be a self-fulﬁlling correc-
tion to an overheated lending boom: if entrepreneurs suddenly believe that their peers will no longer take
excessive risk, they are better oﬀ reverting to prudent investment policies themselves. The resulting drop in
output is not a crisis that entails underinvestment, but a correction that restores eﬃciency.
We extend our basic model to include land which serves both as a factor of production and as collateral.
We show that the model explains various stylized facts about the behavior of asset prices during lending
booms. During a boom, the prices of productive assets are often inﬂated in a way that is hard to reconcile
with historical fundamentals. In our model, this arises because they also capitalize future subsidies implicit
in bailout guarantees. The eﬀect is likely to be reinforced if the country recently experienced an improvement
in contract enforecement. Second, returns in the beginning of a boom are volatile and negatively skewed.
The latter feature is arises naturally from the asymmetric adjustment costs implied by ﬁnancing constraints.
Finally, asset prices typically peak well before the lending boom ends: they anticipate the soft landing. This
is also in line with the data.7
AARON: how about the land price - soft landing mechanism here ??
Our setup is related to existing ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ models of a small open economy. These models are
also driven by ﬁnancing constraints and feature entrepreneurial net worth as the key state variable. However,
the presence of bailout guarantees overturns several results typically associated with ﬁnancing accelerator
models. First, our model gives rise to both over- and underinvestment, whereas typically ﬁnancing constraints
7Aarron: herre need a quote; perrhaps also on the otherr facts in this paragrraph
3induce underinvestment. Better contract enforcement or infusions of net worth thus not necessarily improve
eﬃciency of investment. Second, because of the soft landing eﬀect, a positive shock to net worth may decrease
investment in our model. This means that the link between cash ﬂow and investment is nonlinear, positive
for ﬁrms with low net worth, but negative when net worth is higher. Simple linear regression analysis of the
relationship between cash ﬂow and investment may thus not be able to uncover the importance of ﬁnancing
constraints.
The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this introduction summarizes stylized facts on lending
booms and reviews related literature. Section 2 presents the simplest version of the model. Here we abstract
from ﬁxed assets and posit an exogenous bailout policy to focus on the dynamics. This minimal setup shows
why soft landings occur. Section 3 describes a more elaborate framework which justiﬁes the bailout policy
and introduces land. Section 4 collects results for this model. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are collected
in the appendix.
1.1. Empirical Evidence on Lending Booms
The existing evidence on lending booms can be read as answering three questions. First, what are the
salient features of macroeconomic aggregates and relative prices during an episode? During a typical boom,
investment rises along with credit.8 In addition, asset prices, in particular that of real estate, rise and the
real exchange rate appreciates.9 On average, lending booms do not end in a ﬁnancial crisis, but rather with
a ‘soft landing’. Asset prices tend to revert before the lending boom ends.10 Although abrupt collapses of
booms are not the norm, it is true that almost all banking and currency crises in emerging markets have
been preceded by lending booms.11 Those lending booms that have ended in a crisis have typically been
followed by a credit crunch. That is, in the aftermath of crises new lending falls sharply and recuperates
only gradually. 12
A second empirical question is whether the quality and composition of investment is diﬀerent during
8Pomerleano (1998) considers data from 734 South East Asian corporations from 1992 to 1996. For the case of Thailand,
the average investment rate during this period was 29% (3% in the US). Furthermore, 78% of this investment was ﬁnanced with
debt (8% in the US). Claessens, et.al. (1998), using a database of 5550 ﬁrms in nine Asian countries, ﬁnd that during the early
1990s investment and leverage were very high and increasing, while proﬁtability was declining. In Thailand during 1988-95 the
investment rate increased from 10% to 14.5%, the debt-to-equity ratio increased from 1.6 to 2.2. The corresponding ﬁgures for
the US are 3.8 to 3.7 and 0.8 to 1.1.
9Gourinchas, et. al (1999) document this fact for the real exchange rate. Guerra (1998) and Hernandez and Landerretche
(1998) document the appreciation of real estate and stock prices.
10Gourinchas et. al. (1999) ﬁnd that in a sample of 91 countries over the past 35 years, the probability that a lending boom
will end in a currency crisis is less than 20%. Furthermore, the build-up and ending phases of an average boom are similar in
magnitude and duration.
11See Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Tornell (1999).
12See for example Krueger and Tornell (1999) or Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995).
4lending booms, when compared to normal times. Naturally, an answer to this question is not as easily
quantiﬁable, and the existing evidence is largely anecdotal. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a tendency
for the quality of investment to deteriorate during lending booms.13 Moreover, ﬁrms and banks have been
noted to shift to activities that have traditionally been considered to be more risky, such as investment in
real estate.14 Not all ﬁrms experience booms and busts in the same way. Small, bank-dependent ﬁrms and
ﬁrms in the nontradable sector have grown more strongly during the boom, but have been slower to recover
after the crisis than large exporting ﬁrms with access to direct ﬁnance.15
Third, there is some direct evidence that the two distortions we focus on are present especially in emerging
markets. While such guarantees exist in many countries, in emerging markets they are tend not to be
accompanied by a strong regulatory framework.16 In addition, in many emerging markets contracts are not
as easily enforceable as in developed countries.17
1.2. Related Literature
In this section we will discuss in more detail how our model relates to previous theoretical work. In stressing
the role of borrowers’ wealth as a key state variable, our model belongs to the class of ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’
models. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989) a number of authors have explored propagation mechanisms
derived from the dynamics of lender-borrower relationships. Whenever the relationship between borrowers
and lenders is subject to one of the imperfections familiar from standard static models of the debt constrained
entrepreneurial ﬁrm, the marginal cost of external ﬁnance depends on borrowers’ wealth.18 Independent
exogenous shocks, for example to borrower wealth, may then have persistent eﬀects to the extent that they
aﬀect borrowers’ wealth and hence the cost of external ﬁnance in the following period. Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) have enriched the basic mechanism by pointing out the role of durable assets, which are desired by
borrowers as both factors of production and collateral19. The feedback eﬀects between borrower wealth and
asset prices provide an important ampliﬁcation device for the basic ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. Small open
economy models with a ﬁnancial accelerator include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1998) and Antinolﬁ
and Huybens (1998).
13Pomerleano (1998) ﬁnds that the return on assets in his sample of Thai ﬁrms fell from 9% in 1992 to 5% in 1996 (9% and
13% in the US). Claessens, et.al. (1998) document that the real return on assets fell from 11% to 8%.
14See, for example, Bank for International Settlements (1999).
15See Krueger and Tornell (1999).
16See Bank for International Settlements (1999).
17See, for example, Johnson et al. (1999).
18Several ways of modeling imperfections have been proposed. For example, moral hazard with costly state veriﬁcation
(introduced by Townsend (1979)), is employed e.g. in Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1998) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996); ex
ante moral hazard, studied by Holmstrom and Tirole (1995), is used by Aghion and Bolton (1995); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
rely on a version of the Hart and Moore (1994,1997) incomplete contracting theory of debt ﬁnance.
19While in the KM model the durable good is land, other papers (e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1998)) have considered a setup in which the price of capital is allowed to ﬂuctuate due to adjustment costs.
5The main diﬀerence between our model and existing ﬁnancial accelerator models is that in our lending
booms entrepreneurs take on highly risky, negative net present value projects. It thus accounts for the
excess risk taking and low investment quality of observed in many lending booms. Financial accelerator
models explain neither this fact, nor soft landings because lending would stop if negative NPV projects
were undertaken in equilibrium. Note also that comparative statics diﬀer. For instance, a worse contractual
enforceability is usually ‘bad’ in ﬁnancial accelerator models because it prevents borrowers from undertaking
good projects. In contrast, in our model it prevents wasteful investment and makes the emergence of lending
booms more diﬃcult.
Ljungqvist (1995), Krugman (1998a,b) and Corsetti et al. (1999) have both studied the role of the moral
hazard problem arising from government guarantees in the context of a growth model. They show that
overinvestment and mispricing of capital can occur if borrowers’ liabilities are guaranteed by the government.
Ljungqvist (1995) also compares stationary equilibria of economies with and without guarantees and ﬁnds
that the former are subject to larger swings in asset prices. In contrast to our model, borrowers in these
papers are competitive ﬁrms who do not have wealth of their own (there is free entry into operating the
technology). The gradual development of lending booms is then generated by invoking adjustment cost of
investment, rather than a gradual increase in entrepreneurial wealth. Thus, there is no gradual interplay
between lending and asset prices in the build-up phase of a lending boom. More importantly, these models
generate neither soft landings, nor balance sheet eﬀects, such as those that were reported in the aftermath
of crises.
Another related paper is Allen and Gale (1998). This paper explores the eﬀects of risk shifting behavior
by borrowers who issue standard debt to lenders. As in the literature on ﬁrm capital structure, the convex
payoﬀ proﬁle of the borrower’s residual income turns risk neutral borrowers into risk lovers. Allen and Gale
exploit the eﬀect of this on asset prices: since borrowers are the only agents who have access to the asset
market, assets are priced according to their (distorted) marginal utility. This is how a bubble can develop.
We invoke the same principle to get mispricing in our model, except that the distortion in entrepreneurs’
‘eﬀective’ preferences arises from government guarantees. A second key diﬀerence between our analysis and
that of Allen and Gale is that they are not concerned with the gradual development of lending booms. In
their model, the supply of credit granted by lenders is exogenous, and there is no feedback between asset
prices and lending.
2. The Soft Landing Mechanism
2.1. Setup
We consider a small open economy, populated by overlapping generations of risk neutral entrepreneurs.
Every entrepreneur in generation t owns a risky production technology, which turns kt units of the single
6numeraire good invested in period t into
yt+1 = zt+1f (kt)
units of the good in period t+1. The productivity shock zt+1 is i.i.d.: it equals one with probability α,a n d
zero otherwise. An entrepreneur begins the period with internal funds wt. He can raise additional funds
bt by issuing debt with a promised interest rate ρt to risk neutral foreign investors. Foreigners have ‘deep
pockets’: they are willing to lend any amount, provided that they expect to earn at least the riskless rate
world interest rate, ﬁxed at r. Entrepreneurs also have access to alternative investment opportunities that
earn the riskless rate, which we refer to as ‘riskless savings’ st. The budget constraint is thus
st +kt = wt + bt.
Distortions
There are two distortions in this economy. First, entrepreneurs cannot commit to repay debt: they may
default strategically. If they do so, lenders can try to seize their assets. However, lenders can only recover
multiples ψk and ψs of ﬁxed capital and riskless savings, respectively, with ψk,ψs ≤ 1+r. Default is thus
attractive to entrepreneurs unless the promised debt repayment is lower than the ‘collateral value’ of assets:
(1 +ρt)bt ≤ ψsst +ψkz¯ t+1kt. (2.1)
The second distortion is the existence of an agency which guarantees entrepreneurs’ debt. In particular, we
assume that, if entrepreneurs default in the ‘bad state’ zt =0 , foreign lenders are bailed out by this agency,
so that they recover principal plus riskless rate, (1 +r)bt. There is no bailout in the good state. This bailout
scheme will be derived endogenously in the next section as the outcome of a game between entrepreneurs
and lenders.
2.2. Optimal Investment and Financing
The goal of an entrepreneur in period t is to maximize expected proﬁts, subject to the constraint that lenders
must break even. It is optimal to not default in the good state, and to oﬀer the riskless rate ρt = r.20 This
implies a collateral constraint
(1 − βψk)kt +(1− βψs)st ≤ wt, (2.2)
where β = 1
1+r. Internal funds thus bound the amount of investment, a familiar property of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms. Moreover, in contrast to most existing setups, our model features several investment
opportunities that diﬀer in the extent to which returns can be pledged to lenders. The entrepreneur must
20Indeed, from (3.2), it is not credible to promise more than (1 + r)bt in the bad state. Therefore, the lender can only break
even if at least (1 + r)bt is repaid in the good state. Of course, it is never optimal to repay more than that.
7thus allocate scarce internal funds among these opportunities. The ‘price’ he assigns to an opportunity
depends negatively on the fraction of proceeds that can be pledged, ψs or ψk.
In this section, we focus on the case where riskless savings can be fully pledged to lenders, ψs =1+r.
Expected proﬁts
Π(kt,w t)=( 1 + r)wt +[αf (kt) −(1+r)kt]
+(1−α)(1+r)max{kt − wt,0}
must be maximized subject to the budget and collateral constraints. Here the second term represents proﬁts
from running the ﬁrm, while the third term captures the subsidy due to the bailout guarantee. This subsidy
can only be claimed by picking a risky plan, which entails default in the bad state (kt >w t). In contrast, a
safe plan (kt ≤ wt) does not involve any borrowing: the ﬁrm is entirely ﬁnanced internally.
Optimal Safea n dR i s k yP l a n s
Suppose the entrepreneur opts for a safe plan. He will then try to operate the technology at the ﬁrst
best level k∗
t, which equates the marginal product of capital to the interest rate:
αf￿ (k∗)=1+r
If internal funds are insuﬃcient to ﬁnance k∗, the marginal product is higher than 1+r and all internal
funds should be invested. The optimal safe investment is thus ks (wt): =m i n{wt,k∗}. In contrast, under a
risky plan, the subsidy provided through the bailout is increasing in the amount borrowed. This artiﬁcially
lowers the marginal cost of capital. Under the best risky plan, the entrepreneur would like to invest up to






This amount can again only be ﬁnanced if suﬃcient internal funds are available, since the collateral constraint




   
   
wt
1−βψk if wt < (1 −βψk)ˆ k
ˆ k if (1 −βψk)ˆ k<w t ≤ ˆ k
wt if wt > ˆ k
Here the ﬁrst subcase reﬂects the collateral constraint, and the last subcase follows from our deﬁnition of a
risky plan.
Trading oﬀ Subsidy versus Eﬃciency
8Proﬁts under the best risky and safe plan, Π(kr (w),w) and Π(ks (w),w), respectively, are compared
in Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows three investment regions, the existence of which is proven formally in the
appendix. First, for low internal funds, risky plans are always optimal. They permit the entrepreneur to
leverage the ﬁrm, and if the marginal product of capital is high, this is clearly desirable. In fact, as long
as w<k ∗, the collateral constraint keeps the ﬁrm in an underinvestment region, relative to the ﬁrst best.
Second, risky plans remain optimal even as w>k ∗, giving rise to a region of ineﬃcient overinvestment
and risk taking. As investment is increased beyond k∗, the marginal decrease in expected proﬁts due to
ineﬃcient investment is initially second order. It is outweighed by the ﬁrst order increase in proﬁts due to
the guarantee. The latter increase occurs as long as ﬁrm leverage is suﬃciently high.21 Finally, there is an
eﬃcient investment region. If internal funds are high enough, the expected loss of the entrepreneur’s own
stake in the ﬁrm cannot be compensated by the subsidy. The entrepreneur is better oﬀ to self-ﬁnance the
ﬁrm, and run it at the ﬁrst best scale.
These results of our model are reminiscent of the literature on deposit insurance and capital requirements.
In both cases, high leverage (a low capital ratio) goes along with high risk taking. However, a key diﬀerence
is in what is exogenous to the ﬁrm in a given period. The deposit insurance literature typically considers
banks of a ﬁxed scale, but with variable capital chosen by shareholders with ‘deep pockets’. The models
predict changes in leverage and risk as a result of changes in regulation. For example, if capital requirements
are relaxed, shareholders prefer higher leverage and riskier loan portfolios. This setup is motivated by large
US banks. In contrast, our entrepreneurial ﬁrms have variable scale, but their capital is predetermined by
the wealth of the entrepreneur. It thus predicts changes in leverage and risk as a result of changes in past
proﬁts. This gives rise to our dynamic analysis, to be considered next.
2.3. Dynamics: Lending Booms with a Soft Landing
We assume that entrepreneurs bequeathe their ﬁrms to their heirs. More precisely, if the good state zt+1 =1
is realized, they consume a fraction c of proﬁts Πt, and pass on the rest, together with the technology. If the
bad state is realized, we assume that the young generation receives a small aid payment ε.T h ew e a l t ho fa
representative dynasty is thus evolves over time according to
wt+1 =( 1−c)zt+1Πt+1 +( 1−zt+1)ε.
Figure 2 sketches the dynamics of the model. There are two transition functions: one for the good and one
for the bad state. This allows to trace out paths of wealth and investment, given a realization of the shocks.
21For example, for w<(1 − βψk) ˆ k, the leverage ratio under a risky plan is constant.
9For a concrete example, suppose the economy is initially at point A in Figure 2. Entrepreneurs are
relatively poor and a lack of collateral prevents them from investing at an eﬃcient scale. If good shocks
occur, internal funds are gradually built and ﬁrms grow. However, during this phase output is volatile
and growth rates are negatively skewed: downturns are sharp and short ‘crises’ that have persistent output
eﬀects, since lending booms are long and gradual. If a boom is long enough, it will eventually overheat:
entrepreneurs begin to ﬁnance projects that have negative net present value. In this phase, vulnerability to
crises remains a problem: in fact, output falls even more if a crisis occurs. In addition, any crisis will feature
the failure of a fair number of ‘white elephant’ project that everybody knew up front to be unreasonable.
How does a lending boom end ? If it is not punctuated by a crisis, entrepreneurial wealth will eventually
reach the eﬃcient region. Investment in the risky technology drops down to the ﬁrst best level: there is a
soft landing. The negative net present value projects that correspond to investment levels between k∗ and ˆ k
are only worthwhile if they can be ﬁnanced with other people’s money, and subsidized by the bailout agency.
Once entrepreneurs have become suﬃciently rich, this is no longer possible. Inevitably, the failure of ‘white
elephant’ projects would eat up too much entrepreneurial capital. Therefore, entrepreneurs reduce the scale
of operations; they prefer to invest in riskless projects. If good shocks to continue to occur, the ‘lucky path’
leads the economy to the steady state at point B, where investment and savings remain constant. Of course,
if bad shock occurs, entrepreneurs bounce back to lower wealth levels. However, the eﬀect of a bad shock on
output is milder and less persistent in the eﬃcient region.
Since entrepreneurial net worth is a key state variable in our model, it is interesting to examine unan-
ticipated changes in it. This impulse response diﬀers across the three investment regions. First, there is no
eﬀect on output in the eﬃcient region, unless the shock manages to move the economy out of this region.
In contrast, in the underinvestment and most of the overheating region, an increase in net worth increases
output. However, if a shock pushes the economy from the overheating to the eﬃcient region, an increase in
net worth may actually decrease investment and output. It follows that the response to shocks in our model
is highly nonlinear. In particular, in an economy with bailout guarantees, simple test based on regressions
of investment on net worth measures may well understate the importance of ﬁnancing constraints. This will
be true especially for ﬁrms thatare relatively large.
It is interesting to compare the dynamics of our model with alternative setups that rely on only one of the
two distortions. First, suppose there are no bailout guarantees. Entrepreneurs do no contribute any wealth
of their own and they can borrow any amount they want at the riskless rate. This situation corresponds to
the case in which ψs =0and ψ = β
−1. It follows that at time 0 capital will jump to the Pangloss level ￿ k. The
model then has no internal propagation mechanism: gradual development of lending booms and persistent
10eﬀects of crises must follow from the persistence of shocks, unless some other adjustment cost is imposed.
Moreover, a soft landing cannot occur: all lending booms must end in a crisis.
Second, suppose there are no bailout guarantees. The model then reduces to a fairly standard ‘ﬁnancial
accelerator model’ along the lines of Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Without guarantees, interest rates reﬂect
the riskiness of the projects. Thus, entrepreneurs never invest beyond the eﬃcient level k∗; there is no
overheating. The ﬁnancial accelerator model also features internal propagation through net worth and a
nonlinear response to shocks. However, higher cash ﬂow can never lead to less investment, as is the case in
a soft landing. This additional source of nonlinearity is unique to our model. Another diﬀerence is in the
relationship between returns and constraints. In the ﬁnancial accelerator model, a constrained ﬁrm always
has a high marginal product of capital. In contrast, in our model, constraints bind at both high and low
MPK ﬁrms: the unconstrained ﬁrms in the eﬃcient region have intermediate returns.
3. A Model with Land
In this section we introduce a second productive factor in order to characterize. We consider the same setup
as in the previous Section excep that now there are two goods: an internationally tradable good, which is the
numeraire, and land, which is inelastically supplied. Both, the competitive and the crony sectors produce
the numeraire good. We proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the interaction between lending and
asset prices by considering a ﬁnite terminal time T. Then, we study the mechanism that generates the soft
landing by endogenizing T.
Technology
As before entrepreneur i has two investment opportunities: a safe storage technology that transforms one
unit of the numeraire into 1+r units the next period, and a risky technology that combines k units of the





t,g ￿ > 0,g ￿￿ < 0
Linearity in k implies that the leverage ratio will be constant in equilibrium, which greatly simpliﬁes the
analysis.22 However, it rules out switches.
The productivity parameter θt may take two values: θ or 0. It follows a Markov process with transition
matrix

 α 1 − α
01

. In other words, the economy can experience a string of good luck, but once this
22To draw the connection to the previous section think of the previous section’s production function as representing a set of
perfectly correlated indivisible investment projects each with ‘capacity’ dkt.
11string ends, it never starts again. In section 5 we will drop this assumption and consider a standard non-
degenerate transition matrix in which the elements (0,1) are replaced by (α,1−α). As we will see, the results
stated in Propositions 1 and 2 will remain unchanged.
In order to have overinvestment in equilibrium it is necessary that the risky technology have a greater
return than the safe return in good times, but a lower expected return. This is captured by the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 T h er e t u r no nr i s k yc a p i t a l ,θg(l), satisﬁes θg(0) = 1 +r as well as
αθg(l) < 1+r<θ g (l) < ∞ for all l>0 (3.1)
Markets, Borrowing and Bailouts
The supply of land is ﬁxed at one, and there exists a competitive market for land. We will denote by
pt(θt) period t’s price of land if the state is θt. As in the previous section, lenders will only lend if there is
collateral, which they can grab in case of default.
Assumption 2 An entrepreneur can pledge as collateral his land, a share ψ<1+r of his risky capital,
a n das h a r eψs < 1+r of his wealth invested in the safe technology.
Collateral can be costlessly appropriated by lenders in case of default. It follows that at time t +1the
value of the collateral will be pt+1(θt+1)li
t + ψki
t + ψsst.23 As before, a bailout occurs if and only if more
than 50% of entrepreneurs default in a given period.
The Credit Market Game
The timing of events for a given generation of entrepreneurs and lenders is as follows. Entrepreneurs
announce plans for risky investment (ki
t) and land purchases (li
t) as well as how much debt they want to issue
(bi
t) and the interest rate they promise (ρi
t). Lenders then decide whether to accept or reject these oﬀers.
During the next period the shock is realized and borrowers make their default decision. A bailout occurs if
more than half of the entrepreneurs defaults24.
23To motivate the term ψ<1+r let ψs =0and suppose that in case of bankruptcy the entrepreneur can divert a share δ of
his cash ﬂow, which is θt+1g(li
t)ki
t. Thus, the lender will be able to appropriate the entrepreneur’s land and the remaining cash
ﬂow [1 − δ]θt+1g(li
t)ki
t. It then follows that the “pledgeability coeﬃcient” corresponds to the lower bound of this expression:
ψ =[ 1− δ]θg(0). Condition (3.1) then implies that 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1+r.
24In several countries credit ﬂows occur in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage domestic banks borrow from foreign creditors. These
loans are typically not collateralized, but enjoy government bailout guarantees. In a second stage domestic banks, in turn, make
collateralized loans to domestic ﬁrms. In the model we merge both stages.
12We will relegate the details of this credit market game to the appendix and will merely state two important
results. First, there always exists a safe equilibrium in which nobody invests in the risky technology and
there is no lending. Since in this case there is no bailout in the bad state, it does not pay for an individual
entrepreneur to deviate and invest in the risky technology, because the latter has negative NPV (Assumption
1).
Second, in a symmetric equilibrium with positive investment in the risky technology (this will be referred
to as a ‘risky equilibrium’), there cannot be default in the good state. If everyone were to always default, a
bailout would always occur. But then an entrepreneur could deviate by issuing even more debt and investing
it, say, in land.
Consider then the case in which all entrepreneurs repay their debt in the good state. From the nature of
the commitment problem, suﬃcient collateral is required to prevent an individual borrower from defaulting in
the good state. At the same time, lenders will break even if they are promised the riskless interest rate. This
is because in the bad state everyone will default and there will be a bailout. Since lenders are competitive,
the riskless rate is precisely what borrowers will oﬀer. The bottom line is that lenders are willing to charge
















Suppose an entrepreneur were to deviate by borrowing more than ¯ bi
t. He would default in the good state
at time t +1 . Lenders will agree to such a plan only if the payment they receive in the bad state (through
the bailout) is large to enough to compensate them for the loss in the good state. But, by assumption, the
payment per dollar invested from a bailout is only the riskless rate. Consequently, the expected payoﬀ to
lenders under the proposed deviation would be strictly less than the riskless rate, and lenders will not agree
to the proposed plan. It follows that equilibrium plans are those that yield the entrepreneur maximum payoﬀ
among all plans that satisfy (3.2).
During each period, given his inherited wealth wi
t, a young entrepreneur solves the following problem.
Problem I Taking as given current and expected land prices, choose how much to borrow (bi
t ≥ 0), land-
holdings (li
t ≥ 0), capital (ki
t ≥ 0),and how much to store (si
t ≥ 0) in order to maximize the expected




































t(θt) if t ≥ 1
e if t =0
(3.5)
We will only consider symmetric equilibria. Thus, in what follows we will omit the superscript i and
consider a representative entrepreneur. A symmetric rational expectations equilibrium (REE) consists of





t=0,o fw e a l t h{w∗
t}T
t=0, and of land prices {p∗
t}T
t=0, such
that, every period the land market clears (l∗










t) solves Problem I taking as given wealth w∗
t, current
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The two cases considered in the preceding deﬁnition correspond to the two types of credit market equi-
libria: a safe equilibrium in which no one invests in the risky technology and there is no lending, and a risky
equilibrium. This implies that there are multiple REE. In particular, one might construct REE in which a
lending boom breaks down because some ‘sunspot’ causes agents to revert to the safe equilibrium. Since the
focus in this paper is on the sustainability of lending booms, for the most part we will consider equilibria
where the lending boom continues as long as possible.
3.1. The Lucky Path and Temporary Equilibria
Note that if there were no bailouts, lenders would be willing to lend only at interest rates no lower than
1+r
α −1 >r .Since entrepreneurs must contribute some equity to the risky project, they would not be willing
to borrow because their expected rate of return would be lower than the riskless rate. As a result, in a
no-bailout regime there would be no investment in the risky technology and the price of land would be zero.
Using this benchmark we will say that there is a lending boom, an investment boom, and asset price inﬂation
if bt,k t, and pt follow increasing paths, respectively.
Lending booms may occur in a world with bailouts because entrepreneurs may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
undertake negative NPV projects. This is because there is an implicit bailout subsidy that arises from the
fact that lenders will be willing to charge the riskless interest rate. The size of the subsidy depends on how
much entrepreneurs can borrow. With the presence of a commitment problem, the subsidy may be too small
to make negative NPV investment proﬁtable. Consequently, the existence of bailout guarantees does not
ensure the existence of lending booms and asset price inﬂation. Our objective is to determine the conditions
under which they will occur.
Since the value of today’s collateral depends on tomorrow’s possible land prices, we need to solve for
the entire sequence of future prices to obtain today’s equilibrium allocation. This computation is greatly
simpliﬁed because θt =0implies pt+j =0for all j ≥ 0. Recall that if the productivity parameter θt =0 ,
then θt+j =0for all j>0. This implies that there will be no more investment after time t, and thus no
14reason to borrow. Since land is only used as either collateral or as an input in risky production, it becomes
worthless once θt =0 . In section 5 we will show that the main results hold if we drop the assumption that
0 is an absorbing state.
Since θt =0implies pt+j =0 , we can characterize all risky REE by considering only “lucky paths” along
which θt is always equal to θ. We will construct REE by ﬁrst deriving risky temporary equilibria (TE) for
a given level of wealth w and for given future prices {ˆ p(θ)=ˆ p, ˆ p(0) = 0}. As y m m e t r i cr i s k yT Ei sa
collection (k,l,s,b,p) such that (k,l,s,b) solve Problem I taking land prices as given and the land market





Proposition 1. For every wealth level w a n de x p e c t e dl a n dp r i c eˆ p, there is a threshold for the pledge-
ability parameter ψ ∈ (0,β
−1) such that if ψ ≥ ψ, there exists a unique symmetric risky TE. In this
equilibrium: s∗ =0 ,
k∗ =
w
[1 − βψ][1 + γ(1)]
(3.7)
b∗ = β[ˆ p +ψk∗] (3.8)
p∗ = βˆ p +
γ(1)
1+γ(1)w (3.9)
The threshold ψ is uniquely determined by 1
β = R(ψ): ≡
α[θg(1)−ψ]
[1−βψ][1+γ(1)].
Observe that the threshold ψ is strictly positive. If only land could be pledged as collateral (ψ =0 ), as
e.g. in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), then risky equilibria would not exist.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix. Here we simply present the intuition. Consider an
entrepreneur who contemplates investing in the negative NPV technology. This can only be proﬁtable if he
defaults in the bad state and thus claims the subsidy provided by the government through the implicit bailout
guarantee. Indeed, the guarantee must be large enough to outweigh the expected loss the entrepreneur makes
by putting his own wealth at risk. Let wp := w−(1−βψs)s denote the amount of wealth which lenders can
a p p r o p r i a t ei nc a s eo fd e f a u l t .W ec a nt h i n ko fp l e d g e a b l ew e a l t hwp as the ‘equity’ an entrepreneur puts
up for a ﬁrm operating the risky technology. Given that the entrepreneur follows a risky policy that leads
her to default in the bad state (i.e., (1 + r)(st − bt)>(1 +r −ψs)st), budget constraint (3.4) implies that
the objective function can be rewritten as
Eπ = w +α[βθg(l)k −[p −β￿ p]l −k] − [1 − α]wp (3.10)
25To simplify notation, when we will omit the dependence of a variable on θt,we will refer to the value of the variable along
the lucky path.
15The second term is the expected excess return from operating the risky technology, while the third term
is the expected loss from default. Since the government subsidy is increasing in the amount borrowed,
entrepreneurs would like to leverage up their ﬁrms as much as possible26. Equivalently, they want to make
t h ee x c e s sr e t u r ni n( 3 . 1 0 )l a r g er e l a t i v et op l e d g e a b l ew e a l t h .H o w e v e r ,t h ed e g r e eo fl e v e r a g ei sl i m i t e db y
the borrowing constraint
ul +( 1−βψ)k ≤ wp (3.11)
Since (3.11) must hold with equality, we can rewrite (3.10) as
Eπ = w +[αβ[θg(l) − ψ]K−1]w
p, K≡ k
wp (3.12)
Where K is the capital-equity ratio. Equation (3.12) makes clear that investing in the risky technology is
proﬁtable only if K is large enough. In particular, if the ﬁrm were entirely equity ﬁnanced, then K≤1,a n d
the excess return on equity would be negative.
To determine how high of a K entrepreneurs can attain in equilibrium, note from (3.11) that unless
debt can be fully secured by invested capital (ψ = β
−1), every dollar invested in k requires extra equity of
1 − ψβ. Similarly, every unit of land purchased requires extra equity of p − β￿ p. At an optimum the ratio








Since in a risky equilibrium l∗ =1 , price equation (3.9) in Proposition 1 follows from (3.13). Similarly,
equilibrium capital (3.7) follows from (3.11) and (3.13). Thus, the equilibrium capital-equity ratio is K∗(ψ)=
1
[1−βψ][1+γ(1)].
Thus, K∗ and the risky return depend on the importance of land in production γ(1), and on the pledge-
ability parameter ψ. To understand the role of γ(1) note that in equilibrium γ(1) =
p
∗−β￿ p
(1−βψ)k∗ (by (3.6) and
(3.13)). That is, γ(1) equals the ratio of land’s equity requirements to capital’s equity requirements. The
more important land is in production, the higher its equilibrium opportunity cost, and the more equity (own
wealth) is needed to support it. A greater γ(1) reduces K and the risky return for the following reason. Since
the supply of land is ﬁxed, in equilibrium the marginal return to land derives from capital gains. However,
26To illustrate the role of the bailout guarantee we can write Eπ = w+ {αβθg(l)k− k−(p−αβ￿ p)l− (1−α)βψss}+( 1 −α)b,
where the term in braces is expected proﬁt in the absence of a bailout guarantee and the last term is the bailout subsidy.
27The probability of the lucky state αvanishes from the “pricing condition” (3.13). Since lenders are bailed out in the bad
state, they simply set the borrowing constraint to ensure that they are repaid in the lucky state (i.e., they set ¯ b = β[ˆ p+ψk+ψss]
instead of ¯ b = αβ[ˆ p +ψk+ ψss]). This implies that the opportunity cost of land is [p−βˆ p] instead of the “true cost” [p−αβˆ p].
Similarly, the opportunity cost of capital 1 − βψ diﬀers from the true cost 1 − αβψ. In other words, the bailout guarantee
induces borrowers and lenders to evaluate future payoﬀs under the best possible scenario, rather than using expected values.
This is the “mispricing” of debt in a world of deposit insurance which has been used by Krugman (1998) and Mckinnon and
Pill (1997).
16since the equilibrium price of land cannot grow faster than the safe return, it follows that greater investment
in land reduces excess risky returns in equilibrium28.
An increase in ψ has two opposing eﬀects on the risky return. First, it allows a greater share of risky
capital to be pledged as collateral, increasing the leverage of the ﬁrm. Second, it increases γ(1). We show
in the appendix that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates (Lemma 7.6). Thus, there exists a threshold ψ such that the
risky return is no lower than the safe return if and only if ψ ≥ ψ, as stated in Proposition 1.
To sum up, a risky TE exists only if (i) leverage is high enough, and (ii) land does not eat up too much
equity. These two conditions hold if the degree of pledgeability of capital is high enough.
3.2. Rational Expectations Risky Equilibrium
Along a lucky path the conditions that characterize a temporary risky equilibrium must hold for every t ≤ T.
Furthermore, since the entrepreneur repays to the lender bt = β[ptl+ψkt−1], proﬁt equation (3.12) and price
equation (3.9) imply that along the lucky path:
wt =[ 1 − c][θg(1) −ψ]kt−1 (3.14)




In addition, terminal condition pT(θT)=0must be satisﬁed. This results from a zero demand for land
during the last period (T). In what follows we will construct capital, price and wealth sequences that satisfy
(3.7), (3.14) and (3.15). It follows from (3.7) and (3.14) that along the lucky path wealth and the capital
stock satisfy the following recursions
wt = ζwt−1,k t = ζkt−1, where ζ ≡
[θg(1) −ψ][1 −c]
[1 + γ(1)][1 −βψ]
(3.16)










Finally, to obtain the risky REE recall that the ﬁrst generation of entrepreneurs are born with an endowment
e.Thus, (3.7) implies that k∗
0(θ)= e
[1+γ(l)][1−βψ]. For future reference we will summarize our results in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 2. A symmetric risky REE exists if and only if the pledgeability coeﬃcient ψ ≥ ψ. Along the
lucky path safe storage is zero for any t<T.
28Note that if γ(1) is suﬃciently large, the expected return on risky investment falls below the safe return and, the risky
temporary equilibrium ceases to exist. This occurs even if the technology has positive NPV (i.e., α =1 ) .
17• Wealth and risky capital evolve according to
w∗
t = eζ





t 0 ≤ t<T (3.19)



















t 0 ≤ t<T (3.21)
3.3. Equilibrium Dynamics
We can use Proposition 2 to replicate stylized facts 2 and 4. Is there an equilibrium path where investment in
negative expected NPV projects grows gradually? What is the nature of the feedback between asset prices,
investment and lending? As we mentioned earlier, by setting terminal time T<∞ we are imposing the
existence of a soft landing. In the next section we will endogenize T.
The equilibrium equation for capital (3.19) makes it clear that the mere existence of bailout guarantees
and a commitment problem in ﬁnancial markets does not generate investment booms. Even if the necessary
conditions (stated in Proposition 1) for investment in negative NPV projects are satisﬁed, investment will be
decreasing, unless ζ ≡
[θg(1)−ψ][1−c]
[1+γ(1)][1−βψ] > 1. This condition holds if the savings rate (1−c) and the pledgeability
of future cash ﬂows (ψ) are high, or if the technological parameter γ(1) is small. The ﬁrst two conditions
ensure that an increasing amount of resources is invested in risky projects. A low γ(1) ensures that these
r e s o u r c e sd on o te n du pi n v e s t e di nl a n d .R e c a l lt h a tγ(1) determines the equilibrium ratio of land equity
requirements to those of capital.
I no r d e rt ov e r i f yt h a tt h e r em a yb ei n v e s t m e n tb o o m sw en e e dt oc h e c kw h e t h e rζ>1 is consistent with
the restriction on parameters necessary for the existence of a risky REE (ψ ≥ ψ). Since we might rewrite this
condition as R(ψ) ≥ 1/β (see Proposition 1) and since ζ = R(ψ)[1−c]/α, it follows that ψ ≥ ψ is equivalent
to ζ ≥ 1−c
αβ . Therefore, ζ>1 is always consistent with (ψ ≥ ψ). Hence, we have that an investment boom
can always take place.




1−ζβ in (3.20) is decreasing in time for any ζβ ￿= 1, while wt might go either up or down. This has
two implications. If risky investment is non-increasing (ζ ≤ 1), prices must fall. However, increasing risky
investment (ζ>1) does not necessarily lead to increasing prices. Furthermore, even if there were inﬂation,
prices can go up only on a certain time interval, then they must decline. This path is consistent with the
stylized fact that in the initial phase of a LB episode asset prices increase, but fall gradually after the LB
has peaked. The diﬀerent paths that investment and prices can follow are illustrated in Figure 1.
18The intuition is as follows. The return to holding land has two components: capital gains and dividends
derived from the fact that land is an input in production. In the case that investment is declining, the
marginal product of land, and dividends, must fall over time. Since the terminal price of land is zero, capital
gains cannot be increasing if dividends are not. Therefore, if investment is declining, so is the price of land.
In the case that investment is increasing pt cannot increase forever if the horizon is ﬁnite. Agents know that
at time T the price of land will be zero. To prevent arbitrage opportunities the price cannot experience an
anticipated jump at T. Thus, it must start to decline at some earlier time. Therefore, prices can go up only
on a certain time interval, and then they must decline.
Finally, since risky lending is determined by collateral values, the lending path will reﬂect the paths
of investment and prices. Equation (3.21) reveals that risky lending will either be increasing or follow an
inverted U-shaped path whenever there is an investment boom (i.e., ζ>1). However, if risky investment
is declining (i.e., ζ ≤ 1), so is risky lending. For future reference we will summarize these results in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 3.1 (Characterization of a Lending Boom). • If entrepreneurs need to contribute wealth
of their own to risky projects,bailout guarantees need not lead to investment booms. These occur only
if the pledgeability coeﬃcient ψ,and the savings rate 1 − care high.
• Asset price inﬂation arises only if there is an investment boom. However,if the horizon is ﬁnite,prices
will start declining before the investment boom ends.
• In the presence of an investment boom,risky lending might follow an increasing or a inverted U-shaped
path.
It is illustrative to compare the price dynamics with traditional bubble models. If one were to consider the
price in the absence of bailouts as the “fundamental”, then any deviation from this fundamental solution could
be interpreted as a bubble. We should warn the reader that this interpretation is not without controversy
as one could also argue that given the existence of bailouts, the fundamental price is given by (3.20). Given
this caveat, and assuming for the moment that pt > 0 represents a bubble, Proposition 2 shows that in our
model there can be a bubble in the presence of a ﬁnite horizon with certain terminal time, and that this
bubble need not be increasing. Indeed with a ﬁnite horizon it must eventually start to decrease so that the
asset’s price converges to its fundamental value at terminal time T.Thus, in our model asset price bubbles
crash only if the lucky path ends unexpectedly before time T. This stands in contrast to traditional bubble
models, where rational bubbles must increase at the rate of interest, until they unexpectedly crash.
193.4. Self-Fulﬁlling Crises
There are two types of crises in this economy: fundamental and self-fulﬁlling. The ﬁrst occur when θt =0 .
An unexpected self-fulﬁlling crisis occurs if each agent believes that a majority of entrepreneurs will not
invest in the risky technology. If this were the case at some time t, everyone would expect that a bailout
would not be granted at t +1if θt+1 =0 . As a result lenders would be willing to lend only at interest
rates greater than the riskless rate (i.e., ρ ≥ 1+r
α −1 >r ). This hike in interest rates would make the risky
projects’ returns on equity negative. Therefore, at t all entrepreneurs would store all their wealth in the safe
technology. Since the demand for land would fall to zero, its price would unexpectedly jump to zero.
4. Switching Equilibria
In this section we will rationalize the third stylized fact that, on average, LBs do not end abruptly, but
with soft landings. In the previous section soft landings were imposed exogenously by assuming that there
is a date T by which the LB must come to an end. For instance, T can represent the date at which agents
anticipated an event, such as a regulatory reform, after which they will not be able to access risky projects.
In this section we will explore under which circumstances a LB might end endogenously,e v e ni fn or e f o r m
is on the horizon (T = ∞). The point we will make is that once entrepreneurs become rich enough, they
stop investing in negative NPV projects (i.e., risky investment drops to zero). The key ingredient for this to
occur is the existence of an upper bound on the capital that can be invested in the risky project ¯ k.
ki
t ≤ k (4.1)
As we will show in the next section, this upper bound can be considered as reﬂecting the existence of
decreasing returns to capital in the risky technology.
Recall that equity or pledgeable wealth is the wealth that creditors can appropriate in case of default.
That is, wp = w − (1 − βψs)s. In Section 2 we showed that entrepreneurs adopt risky projects if they can
leverage their ﬁrms suﬃciently, and do not need spend too much on land, so that they can attain a high
capital-equity ratio (K = k/wp). In the model of Section 2 a switch cannot occur because along any risky
REE K is constant. As we will see, in the presence of a capacity constraint ¯ k it is possible for equilibrium
Kto fall as wealth increases. Thus, a switch might occur when wealth reaches a certain threshold.
We will consider two scenarios depending on whether safe storage s is fully pledgeable (ψs = β
−1) or not
(ψs <β
−1). If ψs = β
−1and wealth is increasing along the lucky path, then K must fall once ¯ k is reached.
Therefore, there is a time at which all wealth is switched to the safe storage technology. This argument
is similar to that emphasized in the deposit insurance literature, according to which only undercapitalized
banks are subject to the ‘moral hazard problem due to deposit insurance’. Banks with suﬃciently high
capital net of contingent liabilities will behave prudently (Mishkin (1998)).
20Under the second scenario ψs <β
−1 the eﬀective capital argument does not apply because entrepreneurs
can keep their safe storage oﬀ limits from lenders. Thus, in principle, equity (i.e., pledgeable wealth (wp))
could be kept constant while wealth (w) was increasing. Surprisingly, under some conditions this argument
does not hold. This is because once ¯ k is reached entrepreneurs might be tempted to buy more land. Since
land is in ﬁxed supply its opportunity cost will increase. We will show that under some circumstances the
increase in land’s opportunity cost is so large that it drives the equilibrium K below the proﬁtability level.
Therefore, all resources are shifted to the safe storage technology. Note that in both scenarios there is a soft
landing. That is, in anticipation of the switch, at some point in time the price of land peaks and starts to
gradually fall, smoothly reaching zero at the time of the switch.
The only diﬀerence relative to section 2 is the addition of capacity constraint (4.1). We focus again on
risky equilibria in which there is a bailout if the lucky path ends, but not otherwise. Entrepreneurs solve
Problem I with the additional constraint (4.1). As in Section 2 we will construct REE by splicing together
temporary equilibria (TE). Our objective is to show that under the conditions of Section 2, there may be
no risky TE for large wealth levels. Note that, as in Section 2, TE in which everyone uses only the riskless
technology exist for all wealth levels. The results that follow are that under certain conditions, in every
REE, all wealth must eventually be shifted away from the risky technology.
4.1. Returns from storage are fully pledgeable
Since pledgeable wealth equals wp = w−(1−βψs)s, when ψs = β
−1 a l lw e a l t he q u a l se q u i t yi nt h er i s k yﬁr m s
that entrepreneurs run (i.e., wp = w). Now, for a risky TE to exist, the capital to equity ratio K = k/wp
must be larger than a certain threshold ￿ K.S i n c eK inevitably falls with wealth as soon as ¯ k is reached, K
must drop below the threshold ￿ K for suﬃciently large wealth levels. Formally, this leads us to:
Lemma 4.1 (TE: fully pledgeable storage). If ψs = β
−1 and ψ ≥ ψ,then there exists a critical value
of wealth ￿ w (deﬁned in (7.17)) such that a symmetric risky TE exists if and only if w ≤ ￿ w.
Note that the only condition on ψ r e q u i r e di nt h i sL e m m ai so n ea l r e a d yi n v o k e di ns e c t i o n2( ψ ≥ ψ),
which ensures that a risky TE exists for some level of wealth. To establish that in any symmetric REE there
must be a switch, we need only make sure that wealth grows even after investment capacity is reached. As
Proposition 3 will show, this is the case if the savings rate is not smaller than the discount factor.
4.2. Returns from safe storage are not fully pledgeable
The existence of switching in the case ψs = β
−1 relies on the fact that all the bank accounts of entrepreneurs
can be conﬁscated in case of default. This discourages rich entrepreneurs from gambling. What happens if
entrepreneurs’ accounts are oﬀ limits (ψs = 0)? At ﬁrst glance, it appears that there should be no switching.
21After all, why shouldn’t the entrepreneur simply store most of his wealth abroad, and put up just enough
collateral wp = ul+(1−βψ)k to invest up to capacity, thereby running a highly leveraged business at home?
It turns out that this strategy may not be part of an equilibrium.
The reason is that once entrepreneurs have more wealth than is required to reach capacity, they will be
tempted to use this extra wealth to buy more land. Of course, since the supply of land is ﬁxed, the end
result is simply a bidding up of the opportunity cost of land (ut = pt−βpt+1(θ)). This, in turn, increases the
required collateral, causing ¯ K =k/wp to fall. It may therefore be that the equilibrium K is high enough while
capacity has not been reached, but once k = ¯ k equilibrium K drops enough to destroy the risky equilibrium.
In contrast to the previous case, a switch is not inevitable. In the previous case, since ψs = β
−1 and
pledgeable wealth is equal to w, there is always a critical ￿ w above which there is a switch. Here, the drop
in the capital-to-equity ratio is caused by the rise in the equilibrium opportunity cost of land u. Since u is
bounded above by the marginal product of land, u = αβg￿(1)k,L B sc a ng oo nf o r e v e ri fK is suﬃciently high
at u = u. Only if the capital-to-equity ratio is suﬃciently small to begin with (e.g. if ψ is not too large), can
it be driven below the threshold ￿ K. The next Lemma more precisely captures this.
Lemma 4.2 (TE: not fully pledgeable storage). Suppose that ψs <β
−1.
• There exists a threshold ψ ∈ [ψ,β
−1) such that,for any ψ ∈ (ψ,ψ), there is a critical value of wealth
￿ w (given by (7.16)) with the property that a risky symmetric TE exists if and only if w ≤ ￿ w.
• If land is useless in production,there exists no critical wealth level ￿ w. That is, ψ −→ ψ as g￿(1) −→ 0.
The threshold ψ must be strictly less than β
−1, reﬂecting the fact that ψ cannot be too large. In addition
the eﬀect behind this switching result is unique to an economy with land. In the limit, as land becomes
useless (g￿(1) = 0), LBs can persist forever unless (as in the previous Lemma) storage is fully pledgeable.
As in the previous case, if wealth continues to grow after capacity is reached, a switch must eventually
occur. The following Proposition states the conditions under which a switch must occur in any symmetric
risky REE.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is a capacity constraint k ≤ k, and the savings rate is no lower than the
discount factor (1 − c ≥ β).
• Then in every symmetric risky REE there exists a ﬁnite time ¯ τ(ψs) at which wealth reaches the
switching level ￿ w(ψs), deﬁned by (7.16)-(7.17),if:
1. Returns from storage are fully pledgeable (ψs = β
−1),or
2. Returns from storage are not fully pledgeable (ψs <β
−1)a n dψ ∈ (ψ,ψ).





   
   
ζ
te
[1+γ(1)][1−βψ] if t<¯ τ￿(ψs)
¯ k if ¯ τ￿(ψs) ≤ t<¯ τ(ψs)
0 if t ≥ ¯ τ(ψs)
where ¯ τ(ψs) ≤ ¯ τ￿(ψs)+1if ψs <β
−1.
• If ψs <β
−1, t h ep a t ho fp r i c e si sa si nP r o p o s i t i o n1r e p l a c i n gT by ¯ τ(ψs).
Note that risky investment follows the same path as that described by Proposition 2 up to the point
where kτ reaches ¯ k. At that time there might be a switch (k =0and s = w), or the economy might continue
for a while investing in the risky and safe technologies for a while (k = ¯ k and s>0). However, there must
eventually be a switch. Note that if ψs <β
−1, the switch must occur either when capacity is reached or
during the following period.
5. Sequences of Booms and Busts
In section 2 we assumed that after a bust occurs for the ﬁrst time the opportunity to undertake white
elephant investment projects ceases to be available. In some situations this is certainly appropriate. For
instance, one might expect that after the ﬁrst bust a regulatory reform would take place which would prevent
banks from undertaking high risk low return strategies. However, history has produced several examples in
which ﬁnancial crises and bailouts were followed by more lending booms. To capture this pattern we drop
the assumption that the productivity process θt r e m a i n sa tz e r of o r e v e ra f t e ri th a sh i tz e r oo n c e .I n s t e a d
we assume that the process {θt} is independent and identically distributed according to (??), as in Section
4.
In order to get the economy oﬀ the ground after a bad shock we assume that young entrepreneurs receive
a (small) endowment whenever θt = 0. We assume that this endowment equals a very small share ε of last
period entrepreneur’s wealth (i.e., εζwt−1).29 In all other respects the model is as in section 2. In particular,
a bailout takes place if and only if a majority of entrepreneurs cannot repay their debts.
Under the process (??) the price of land will not drop to zero when θt = 0, as happened in section
2. As a result,the analysis becomes more complicated. In this section we will derive a stationary risky
REE under this milder assumption. The relevant state variable is entrepreneurial wealth. As before, A
symmetric stationary lending RE equilibrium consists of entrepreneurs’ policy functions (b∗,l ∗,k ∗,s ∗), as
well as a land price function p∗(w), such that, for each state w, the land market clears: l∗(w)=1 , and
the quadruple (b∗,l ∗,k ∗,s ∗) solves Problem I taking as given wealth w,p r i c e sp∗(w) and price expectations
29Note that if we transfered the same endowment (say e) whenever a bad shock were to hit, then in some cases entrepreneurs’
wealth would be greater in the bad state than in the good state (i.e., ζw < e).
23(p∗([1−c]π(w;θ)),p ∗([1−c]π(w;0))). Note that the conditional proﬁt function π(w;˜ θ) is the equilibrium proﬁt
of an entrepreneur conditional on the future productivity shock. Note also that in every state w,e x p e c t e d
prices are the prices that would arise in the two possible successor states. We prove in the appendix the
following Proposition.
Proposition 5.1. If the pledgeability parameter ψ ≥ ψ, the equilibrium growth rate ζ<1/β, and the
horizon is inﬁnite,then there exits a stationary symmetric risky REE deﬁned on the state space given by
˜ W = {w ∈￿ +}. In every state w ∈ ˜ W:
• Entrepreneurs pay the riskless interest rate,and default if and only if a bad shock occurs.













Note that the equilibrium paths of capital, borrowing and prices are made equal to those in Proposition
2b ys e t t i n gT = ∞. Recall that Proposition 2 was derived under the assumption that the price in the bad
state was always equal to zero. Thus, any entrepreneur who borrowed was automatically unable to repay
in the bad state because all his wealth was wiped out. We showed that in those circumstances, the optimal
policy for an entrepreneur was to borrow up to the value of his collateral. Given this, we derived k∗,l ∗, and
s∗.
In this section land’s price in the bad state is positive (p∗(e) > 0). As before, an entrepreneur can follow
two types of borrowing policies: a ‘risky’ one and a ‘safe’ one. Under a risky policy he will not be able to
repay his debt in the bad state. In contrast, under a safe policy he borrows less than what he will be able to
r e p a yi nt h eb a ds t a t e .P r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1i sp r o v e nb ys h o w i n gt h a tb o r r o w i n gu pt ot h eb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t
is always preferred to any safe borrowing policy. This implies that entrepreneurs solve Problem I of section
2. Therefore, the equilibria are made the same as those characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 by setting
T = ∞.
Following a safe borrowing policy might be more proﬁtable than setting b = ¯ b because land’s price in the
bad state is positive. The argument that shows that an entrepreneur will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate
and choose a safe policy is as follows. Suppose an entrepreneur deviates by choosing a safe borrowing policy
bi <β l ip∗(εw). Since equilibrium prices are increasing in wealth, this deviations entails setting bi < ¯ bi.
Thus, the deviant faces an opportunity cost of capital of 1 instead of 1 − βψ. This deviation implies that
he will set ki =0because the expected marginal product of capital αθg￿(li) is lower than the safe return
1/β. As a result, the return to investing in land will be composed only of capital gains. However, if all
24other entrepreneurs use land in production, the price along the lucky path grows at a lower rate than the
safe rate of return. Thus, the expected gain on land holdings is lower than that on storage. Therefore, the
best strategy for the deviant is to store all wealth. Lastly, if ψ ≥ ψ, storing all wealth does not generate
more expected proﬁts than in equilibrium (for the same reasons as in section 2). Therefore, such a unilateral
deviation is not proﬁtable.





ζwt with probability α
εζwt with probability 1 − α
(5.4)
Suppose we start the economy oﬀ at w = e. It then embarks on a path in which wealth grows (or shrinks!)
at rate ζ. It stays on this path as long as good shocks (θt = θ) prevail. The ﬁrst bad shock returns wealth
to εζwt. The slope of these paths depends (as does the slope of the lucky path in section 2) on whether
ζ is greater or smaller than one. On one hand, if ζ<1, wealth and prices shrink as long as good shocks
prevail. If we set the initial endowment e low, we may think of this case as an equilibrium in which the price
is approximately zero throughout.30 In other words, if the consumption rate and the expenditure share on
land γ(1) are high (so that ζ<1), then lending booms practically do not develop. On the other hand, if
ζ>1, the situation changes dramatically. In this case, an economy starting with wealth e will experience
boom paths of the type characterized in Proposition 2, with prices, lending and investment increasing hand
in hand. While subsequent booms vary in length, with probability one they all end in a crash which leads
to another bailout.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a model that combines two distortions prevalent in numerous economies: government
bailout guarantees and the imperfect enforceability of contracts. This has allowed us to rationalize several
stylized facts associated with lending booms. Also, the model allows us to address issues that have been
at the forefront of the policy debate in recent years. We can address issues such as why it is that ﬁnancial
reforms have often lead to crises, what the correct policy towards capital inﬂows should be and whether
lending booms are necessarily harmful.
We will expand on the last issue by making reference to the privatization of the Mexican banks, although
the same type of debate has been going in several emerging economies. Mexican oﬃcials were well aware of
the LB that was going on during the years following the privatization. However, it was argued that after
decades of statism, the ﬁnancial reforms were essential to building up an entrepreneurial class, accelerating
ﬁnancial deepening and promoting long-run growth. The idea underlying this policy stance runs as follows.
30Recall that the role of the endowment e is only to provide a very small seed for the economy to take oﬀ if θt =0 .
25The economy is composed of an entrepreneurial sector and a competitive sector, and the size of the former
has positive externalities on the latter. For instance, a larger entrepreneurial sector increases the growth
rate of the competitive sector. However, the entrepreneurial sector can only grow gradually (e.g., its capital
stock is limited by entrepreneurial wealth). Thus, policies that accelerate the growth of the entrepreneurial
sector might be beneﬁcial to the economy. Clearly, these policies might generate LBs, in which there will be
asset price inﬂation and some ineﬃcient investment (or looting so to speak). This, in turn, will make the
economy vulnerable to crises during the transition period. However, in this case the beneﬁts might outweigh
the costs. Thus, Mexican oﬃcials might very well say there was nothing wrong ex-ante with their reform
policies.
Our model can readily be extended to rationalize this widespread policy stance. In our model when
entrepreneurial wealth reaches a certain threshold, there is a switch in which all wealth is shifted away
from ineﬃcient projects. Thus, there is a transitional period during which there is asset price inﬂation and
overinvestment. This LB path might end with a soft landing, or with a crash. By modeling the competitive
sector and introducing a policymaker, one could then investigate the class of objective functions that might
render an LB path optimal ex-ante.
Government bailout guarantees and agency problems in ﬁnancial markets are pervasive in numerous
countries. Understanding the macroeconomic implications of these conditions is essential to understanding
the economic experiences of these countries, and to designing economic policies.
7. Appendix
7.1. The Credit Market Game
Here we will analyze the credit market game described in section 2. A typical entrepreneur in cohort t begins
with inherited wealth wt. He observes the price of land (pt), and holds price expectations (pt+1(θ),p t+1(0))
for the two states of nature that are possible in period t +1 .A t t i m e t entrepreneur i makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer (κi
t,b i
t) to lenders, where κi
t i st h er e t u r nh eo ﬀ e r sa n dbi
t i st h ea m o u n th ei sb o r r o w i n g .
Simultaneously he announces his plan (ki
t,l i
t,s i
t), which is required to satisfy budget constraint (3.4). Lenders
then decide whether to accept or reject the contract oﬀered. In period t+1, the productivity shock hits and




















26The lenders who have lent to entrepreneur i get the promised amount κi
tbi
t if either i repays, or i defaults
and a bailout occurs (i.e. more than half of entrepreneurs default). If i defaults but lenders are not bailed
out, their payoﬀ is
πL














We will consider symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of this credit market game. We will assume pt+1(θt+1) <
β
−1pt. Otherwise the demand for land would be inﬁnite.
Lemma 7.1. 1. There is a symmetric SPE of the credit market game in which every entrepreneur stores
all wealth.
2. In every symmetric SPE that allows for positive investment, there cannot be default in the good state.
Proof. In the last stage, entrepreneurs do not default if πi
t+1(def;θt+1) ≤ πi











In particular, if they default in the good state, they will also default in the bad state. Hence, there can never
be an equilibrium in which there is a bailout in the good state, but not in the bad state.
Lenders’ strategies can be characterized by their reservation interest rate. They require the riskless rate if
either (i) there is a bailout in both states, (ii) there is a bailout in the bad state and (7.4) holds for θt+1 = θ,
or (iii) there is no bailout but (7.4) holds for θt+1 =0 . They accept the risky rate 1−r
α −1 if either (i) there
is no bailout and (7.4) holds for θt+1 = θ or (ii) there is a bailout in the bad state, but (7.4) does not hold
for θt+1 = θ.
Suppose everyone stores all wealth. Then there is no bailout in either state. A deviation can only be
proﬁtable if it involves investment in capital. But lenders will require the risky rate 1−r
α −1 which is strictly
higher than the net return on capital for all l. This demonstrates part 1.
Suppose now that there was an equilibrium where a bailout takes place in the good state. As noted above,
there must then be a bailout in both states. But then an entrepreneur could deviate by borrowing more and
buying more land. Lenders would still accept the new oﬀers since the reservation rate is independent of the
borrower’s plan. This would increase proﬁts in the good state since g is increasing in land, while leaving the
proﬁt in the bad state unchanged. This demonstrates part 2.￿
7.2. Proofs of Sections 2 and 3
In this subsection we provide the solution to Problem I, which is not a standard convex problem. Note ﬁrst
that there are two types of policies that solve Problem I: a risky policy, that leads to default in the bad
27state; and a safe policy under which a default never occurs. Note also that in any equilibrium p >α β￿ p(θ).
Otherwise the demand for land would be inﬁnite. It then follows that the best safe policy is given by
k = l =0and s = w. This yields an expected payoﬀ of w. To ﬁnd the best risky policy, we have to maximize
(3.10) subject to borrowing constraint (3.11) and k ≤ ¯ k. Finally, we will have to check whether the best risky
policy yields an expected payoﬀ higher than w. Let I = ul+( 1− βψ)k denote the total collateral required
for running the risky technology. We can search for the best risky policy in two stages: ﬁrst the entrepreneur
chooses an amount of collateral I and storage s and then he allocates collateral optimally between capital k
and land l. The ‘second stage’ problem is
ρ(I)= m a x
k,l
αβ[θg(l) − ψ]k
subject to ul +[ 1− βψ]k = I, k ≤ ¯ k
(7.5)
Here ρ represents expected revenue from the risky technology. Substituting I = ul +[ 1− βψ]k into (3.10)
and (3.11) yields the ‘ﬁrst stage’ problem
max
I,s
π(I): =ρ(I)+α[w − I]+[ 1− α][1 −βψs]s
subject to I +[d1 − βψs]s ≤ w, I ≥ 0,s ≥ 0
(7.6)
It is clear that if ψs <β
−1, the ﬁrst constraint must bind. Meanwhile, if ψs = β
−1, storage drops out from
the ﬁrst stage problem. Thus, the ﬁrst stage problem becomes
max
I,s
π(I): =ρ(I)+η[w −I] subject to 0 ≤ I ≤ w (7.7)
where η =1if ψs <β
−1 and η = α if ψs = β
−1.
Lemma 7.2 (Solution to the second stage problem). Problem (7.5) hasa maximizing solution {l∗(I),k ∗(I)}
if and only if the opportunity cost of land, u = p −β￿ p, is non-negative. Furthermore,
1. There exists a unique level of risky investment, I, such that k∗(I)=¯ k if and only if I ≥ I.




> 0 if I<I
< 0 if I ≥ I
Proof. The Lagrangian associated with problem (7.5) is
L = αβ[θg (l) − ψ]k +λ[I −ul −[1 −βψ]k]+v[¯ k − k] (7.8)
The necessary conditions for a maximum are bi = ¯ bi,
0=αβθg￿(l)k −λu, λ ≥ 0 (7.9)
0=αβ[θg(l) − ψ]− λ[1 −ψβ] − v (7.10)
0=[ ¯ k −k]ν, with k ≤ ¯ k, ν ≥ 0 (7.11)
28Since g￿(l) > 0, (7.9) holds only if u ≥ 0. Since g￿￿(l) < 0,ψ≤ β and u ≥ 0, the bordered Hessian is
unambiguously positive: B ≡ αβθ[1−ψβ][2ug￿(l)−g￿￿(l)k[1−ψβ]] > 0. Thus, the above conditions are also
suﬃcient for a maximum. First, we characterize the optimum in the case k<¯ k.S i n c ev =0and B>0,k
and l are uniquely determined by
u[θg(l) −ψ]=θg￿(l)k[1 − ψβ] (7.12)










B[αβθ]−1 > 0 (7.14)
Since dk
dI > 0, there exists a unique level of I, call it I, such that k(I) ≥ ¯ k if and only if I ≥ I. This proves
part 1 of Lemma 7.2. To derive part 2 note that since λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint in (7.5), ρ￿(I)=λ =
αβ[θg(l)−ψ]





dI > 0 (by (7.14)). Second,
we consider the case k = ¯ k. In this case λ and l are determined by (7.9) and (7.13) substituting ¯ k for k.
Condition (7.10) can then be expressed as:
ν =
￿







I tf o l l o w st h a t( 7 . 1 1 )i ss a t i s ﬁe di fa n do n l yi f I ≥ I ≡ [1 − ψβ][1 + γ(l)]¯ k. Condition (7.13) implies that
dl
dI = 1
u ≥ 0. Since ρ￿(I)=λ =
αβθg￿(l)¯ k




dI < 0 in the case I ≥ I.￿
Note that it is not necessary to provide a complete solution to Problem I for any set of prices. It suﬃces
to consider the case in which the land market clears (l = 1). Problem I has three types of risky solutions (i.e.,
with I>0). There could be either an extremal optimum (I = w)w i t hk<k, an extremal optimum (I = w)
with k = k or an interior optimum (ρ￿(I)=η). We consider each case in turn. We will refer repeatedly to
the following three functions
￿ w(ψ) ≡ αβ[θg(1) −ψ]¯ k (7.16)









w(ψ) ≡ [1 − βψ][1 + γ(1)]¯ k
Lemma 7.3 (TE: k<k and s =0 ). If
w <w (ψ) < ￿ w(ψ),
the unique symmetric risky TE is given by k∗ = w
[1+γ(1)][1−βψ] < ¯ k, l∗ =1 ,b ∗ = ¯ b, s∗ =0and u∗ = p−β￿ p =
γ(1)
1+γ(1)w.
Proof. By substituting (k∗,1) into the ﬁrst order conditions (7.9)-(7.11), one can verify that (k∗,1)i s
a solution to (7.5) given prices u∗ and I = w. This yields expected revenue ρ(w)=
αβ(θg(1)−ψ)
[1+γ(1)][1−βψ]w. The
29shadow price of collateral (i.e. the multiplier on the constraint in (7.5)) at I = w is λ(u∗,w)=
αβ(θg(1)−ψ)
[1−βψ] .
The condition w(ψ) < ￿ w(ψ) implies that λ(u∗,w) > 1. It follows that π￿(w)=ρ￿(w)−η = λ(u∗,w) −η>0,
so that π has a local maximum at I = w. In addition, since k∗ < k is optimal, we must have w<I at
the given prices. Since ρ(I) (and hence π) is convex for all I<w<I (by Lemma 7.2), there cannot exist
another local maximum. Finally, the condition w(ψ) < ￿ w(ψ) is equivalent to π(w)=ρ(w) >w . Thus, the
best risky solution to Problem I is indeed better than the best riskless one.￿
We now ask what happens if capacity is reached. First, there is a wealth range where entrepreneurs
invest up to capacity, but do not store. Then there is a wealth range where they are indiﬀerent between
storage and investment. The following two Lemmas consider these cases.
Lemma 7.4 (TE: k = k and s = 0). If
w(ψ) ≤ w < min{￿ w(ψ), ¯ w(ψ,η)},
the unique symmetric risky TE is given by k∗ = ¯ k, l∗ =1 , b∗ = ¯ b, s∗ =0and u∗ = p−β￿ p = w−[1−βψ]¯ k>0.
Proof. The proof parallels that of the previous Lemma. Again, it can be veriﬁed from the ﬁrst order
conditions that (¯ k, 1) is optimal in the second stage problem for I = w. Expected revenue is now ρ(w)=
αβ(θg(1) − ψ)k = ￿ w(ψ) and the shadow price of collateral is λ(u∗,w) = αβg￿(1)¯ k/u∗. The condition
w<¯ w(ψ,η) implies that λ(u∗,w) > 1,s ot h a tπ￿(w) > 0 and π has a local maximum at I = w. Suppose
there was another (interior) local maximum, say Io,T h e nπ￿(Io)=ρ￿(Io) −η =0and π￿￿(Io)=ρ￿￿(Io) < 0
so we must have I<I o. But ρ￿￿(Io) < 0 for all I>I, contradicting π￿(w) > 0. Finally, the condition
w<￿ w(ψ) is equivalent to π(w)=ρ(w) >w , so that the best risky solution to Problem I is better than the
best riskless one.￿
Lemma 7.5 (TE: k = k and s>0). If
¯ w(ψ,η) ≤ w<
￿ w(ψ) − η ¯ w(ψ,η)
(1 −η)w
,
then the unique symmetric risky TE is given by k∗ = ¯ k, b∗ = b, s∗ = w− ¯ w(ψ,η) and u∗ = p∗ − β￿ p =
η−1αβg￿(1)¯ k
Proof. Regardless of the value of η, it can be veriﬁed from the ﬁrst order conditions that (¯ k, 1)i s
optimal in the second stage problem for I = u∗ +( 1− βψ)k. Expected revenue is ρ(u∗ +( 1− βψ)k)=
αβ(θg(1) − ψ)k = ￿ w(ψ). Consider the ﬁrst stage problem. In the case η =1the shadow price of collateral
is λ(u∗,w)=αβg￿(1)¯ k/u∗ =1 . This together with k∗ = k implies that π has a local maximum at I =
u∗ +(1− βψ)k.S i n c eπ is convex for low I and concave for high I, there can be no other local maximum,
and π(u∗+(1−βψ)k) >π (w). Finally π(u∗+(1−βψ)k)=￿ w(ψ)+α(w−(u∗+(1−βψ)k)) = ￿ w(ψ)+w− ¯ w(ψ,η).
30Thus, the condition ￿ w(ψ) > ¯ w(ψ,η) ensures that the best risky solution to Problem I is better than the best
riskless one.
Now consider the case η = α. The shadow price of collateral is λ(u∗,w)=αβg￿(1)¯ k/u∗ = α.A si nt h e
case η =1 , π has a unique local maximum at I = u∗ +( 1− βψ)k. But now π(u∗ +(1− βψ)k)=￿ w(ψ)+
α(w − (u∗ +( 1− βψ)k)) = ￿ w(ψ)+ α(w − ¯ w(ψ,η)). Thus, the condition stated in Lemma 7.5 ensures that
the best risky solution to Problem I is better than the best riskless one.￿
If (w,ψ) are such that none of the cases considered in Lemmas 7.2-7.5 apply, then the only TE is the
safe one where everybody stores all wealth. This characterizes the symmetric TE for all levels of wealth. In
order to prove that the conditions stated in Lemmas 7.2-7.5 are not vacuous, we need to show that in fact
w(ψ) < ￿ w(ψ), so that a risky TE exists for low wealth levels. The next lemma shows that this is the case.
Lemma 7.6. There exists a unique ψ∈ (0,β
−1) such that w(ψ) < ￿ w(ψ) i fa n do n l yi fψ> ψ . The threshold
ψ is independent of k.
Proof. Deﬁne the functions ￿ J(ψ)=α
θg(1)−ψ
β−1−ψ and J(ψ) =
θ(g(1)+g
￿(1))−ψ
θg(1)−ψ . We have w(ψ) < ￿ w(ψ)
i fa n do n l yi fJ(ψ) < ￿ J(ψ).N o w J(0) > ￿ J(0) by Assumption 1. Moreover ￿ J(ψ) →∞as ψ → β
−1,
whereas J(β











(β−1−ψ)2 = ￿ J￿(ψ) where the last inequality follows from
the fact g is concave so that θg(1) −β
−1 = θ(g(1) − g(0)) >θ g ￿(1). Hence ￿ J(ψ) must cut J(ψ) from below,
so that the intersection is unique.￿
Proof of Proposition 1.
The setup of section 2 has k = ∞. Therefore w <w (ψ) for every w.L e tψ be deﬁned by Lemma 7.6.
Then for all ψ>ψ , Lemma 7.3 applies and delivers the result.￿
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . 1 .
Since ψs = β
−1,w eh a v et h a tη = α. The condition ψ>ψimplies that there is a risky TE for every
w ≤ w(ψ). Now if w(ψ) <w≤ ¯ w(ψ,η), Lemma 7.4 implies that there exists a risky TE for w ≤ ￿ w(ψ), while
if w>¯ w(ψ,η), then Lemma 7.5 implies that there is a risky TE for w ≤
￿ w(ψ)−α ¯ w(ψ,η)
1−α . Combining these
facts, the critical value is
￿ w = max
￿
￿ w(ψ),




P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . 2 .
If η =1 , Lemmas 7.2-7.5 imply that there is a critical value ￿ w = ￿ w(ψ) if and only if
w(ψ) ≤ ￿ w(ψ) < ¯ w(ψ,1)
31It follows from the deﬁnitions that w(ψ) ≤ ￿ w(ψ) implies w(ψ) < ¯ w(ψ,1) for all ψ. Deﬁne the function
J(ψ)=
θg(1)−ψ
θ(g(1)−g￿(1))−ψ. Then w(ψ,1) > ￿ w(ψ) i fa n do n l yi fJ(ψ) < ￿ J(ψ) where ￿ J(ψ)=α
θg(1)−ψ
β−1−ψ . Clearly
J(0) > ￿ J(0) and ￿ J(β
−1)=∞ > J(β








(ψ) which implies that the intersection is unique.￿
Proof of Proposition 3.
We consider ﬁrst the case ψs = β
−1. Since ψ ≥ ψ by assumption, Lemma 4.1 implies that there is a
critical wealth ￿ w deﬁned by (7.17). Note that ￿ w(ψ) < w(ψ,α) if and only if ￿ w = ￿ w(ψ). Lemma 7.3, implies
that for any wealth level wt <w (ψ), in any risky symmetric REE k∗
t = wt
[1−βψ][1+γ(1)] and s∗
t = 0. Wealth
then grows at the rate ζ − 1 > 0 in this region. Denote by τ the ﬁrst time that wealth is no smaller than
w(ψ)
τ =i n f{t ≥ 0 | wt ≥ w(ψ)}
First, if wτ ≥ ￿ w, there is a switch at τ. Second, if wτ < ￿ w and ￿ w(ψ) < w(ψ,α) (i.e. ￿ w = ￿ w(ψ)), then Lemma
7.4 implies that at τ entrepreneurs invest k but do not store. Thus, wτ+1 = 1−c
αβ ￿ w(ψ). Since we have assumed
that 1−c>βt h e r em u s tb eas w i t c ha tτ +1. Third, we consider the case wτ < ￿ w and ￿ w(ψ) > w(ψ,α), so
that ￿ w =
￿ w(ψ)−α ¯ w(ψ,α)
1−α . Note that in this case w must grow beyond w(ψ,α˙ ). Indeed, if wτ < w(ψ,α˙ ), then
Lemma 7.4 implies that wτ+1 = 1−c
αβ ￿ w(ψ) > w(ψ,α). Let τ￿ be such that wτ￿ > w(ψ,α˙ ) (τ￿ could be τ or
τ +1). Lemma 7.5 then implies that wealth satisﬁes wt+1 = 1−c
αβ ￿ w(ψ)+ (1−c)β
−1(wt − ¯ w(ψ,α)) = 1−c
β wt+
(α−1 ￿ w(ψ)− ¯ w(ψ,α)) for all t ≥ τ￿.S i n c e1−c>α βa n di nt h i sc a s e￿ w(ψ) > w(ψ,α), t h ew e a l t hp a t hm u s t
be strictly increasing. Hence, there is a ﬁnite time at which wealth becomes greater that ￿ w, and a switch
must occur.
Next we consider the case ψs <β
−1. Since ψ ∈ (ψ,ψ) by assumption, Lemma 4.2 implies that there is a
critical wealth level ￿ w = ￿ w(ψ). As in the case ψs = β
−1, there is a smallest time τ such that wτ ≥ w(ψ).I f
wτ ≥ ￿ w(ψ), there is a switch at τ.I fi n s t e a dwτ < ￿ w(ψ), then Lemma 7.4 implies that wτ+1 = 1−c
αβ ￿ w(ψ) >
￿ w(ψ), so that there must be a switch at τ +1. ￿
7.3. Proofs of Section 4
We will refer repeatedly to the eﬃcient (k∗) and Pangloss (￿ k) investment levels. They are deﬁned by
αβθf￿(k∗)=1and βθf￿(￿ k)=1 , respectively. To prove Proposition 4 we will characterize the value functions






αβθf(w) if w ≤ k∗
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if w ≤ ￿ k[1 −βψ]




if ￿ k>w>￿ k[1 −βψ]
αβθf(w) if w ≥ ￿ k
(7.19)
The next two Lemmas characterize the value functions associated with the safe and risky policies that an
entrepreneur might follow.
Lemma 7.7. If αβθf￿(0) > 1, then πr(w) >π s(w) for any w on (0,k ∗].
Proof. Deﬁne the function Π(w)=πr(w) − πs(w). Equations (7.18) and (7.19) imply that Π(w) is
continuous. There are two cases. First, in the case k∗ ≤ ￿ k[1 − βψ]
Π(w)=αβθ [f (kr) −f(w)] −α[kr − w],w ∈ (0,k∗] (7.20)
where kr = w
1−βψ. The mean value theorem implies that there exists a constant a ∈ (w,k r) such that
βθf￿(a)=βθ
f(kr)−f(w)
kr−w . Concavity of f implies that βθf￿(a) >β θ f ￿(kr) ≥ βθf￿( k
∗
1−βψ) ≥ βθf￿(￿ k) =1 .
Since βθf￿(a) > 1, it follows that (7.20) is positive for any w on (0,k∗].
Consider now the case k∗ > ￿ k[1 − βψ]. For w ≤ ￿ k[1 − βψ] the argument is the same as the previous
one. For w>￿ k[1 − βψ] replace kr by ￿ k in (7.20), and note that there is a constant b ∈ (w,￿ k) such that
βθf￿(b)=βθ
f(￿ k)−f(w)
￿ k−w . Moreover, βθf￿(b) > 1 because b<￿ k.￿
Lemma 7.8. T h e r ei sau n i q u ew e a l t hl e v e l( ￿ w(ψ)) such that πr(w) <π s(w) if and only if w>￿ w(ψ).
Furthermore, ￿ w(ψ) > ￿ k(1 − βψ) if and only if ψ>￿ ψ, where
￿ ψ ≡
αβθ[f(k∗)−f(￿ k)]−[k∗−￿ k]
[1−α]β￿ k < 1
β (7.21)
Proof. We consider ﬁrst the case k∗ ≤ ￿ k(1 − βψ) ≡ ¯ w. Equations (7.18) and (7.19) imply that Π(w)
has the following three properties. First, for w ≥ k∗, Π(w) is concave. That is, Π￿(w) is declining. Second,
Π￿(w) is negative for any w ≥ ¯ w. Third, Π(¯ w) > 0 i fa n do n l yi fψ>￿ ψ. It follows that there is a unique ￿ w
such that Π(￿ w)=0 . Furthermore, for ψ>(<)￿ ψ,w em u s th a v e￿ w(ψ) > (<)￿ k(1−βψ).
We consider now the case ¯ w<k ∗. Lemma 7.7 implies that Π( ¯ w) > 0.S i n c eΠ￿(w) < 0 for w ≥ ¯ w, there
is a unique ￿ w such that Π(￿ w)=0 . Furthermore, ￿ w>k ∗ > ¯ w.
Finally, we show that ￿ ψ<β
−1. The mean value theorem implies that there is a constant a ∈ (k∗,￿ k)
such that ￿ ψ ≡
1−αβθf
￿(a)
[1−α]β￿ k/[￿ k−k∗]. Since, βθf￿(a) >β θ f ￿(￿ k)=1 , we have that ￿ ψ<
[1−α][￿ k−k
∗]
[1−α]β￿ k < 1
β. The second
inequality follows from ￿ k >k ∗.￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 7.7 implies that the wealth threshold ￿ w(ψ) a tw h i c hi tb e c o m e sp r o ﬁt a b l et os w i t c hf r o mt h e
risky to the safe investment policy is greater than k∗. Lemma 7.8 states that the threshold ￿ w(ψ) is unique,
and establishes that ￿ k is reachable if and only if ψ ≥ ￿ ψ.￿
337.4. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the entrepreneur’s portfolio problem given that a bailout will occur in the bad state, but not in
the good state. If borrowing constraint (3.2) is binding, a borrower owes at the beginning of each period
¯ b(w)/β = lp(ζw)+ψk(w) >l p (εζw) (7.22)
Since ε<1 and price function (5.3) is increasing in wealth, this amount is always greater than the maximum
that an entrepreneur is able to repay if the bad shock hits (which is just the value of his land in state εζw,
i.e. lp(εζw)).
The entrepreneur can follow two types of borrowing policies: risky and safe. ‘Risky borrowing policies’
satisfy
b/β > lp∗(εζw) (7.23)
In contrast, ‘safe borrowing policies’ do not satisfy (7.23). If an entrepreneur follows a risky policy, he will
default in the bad state because the value of his land does not cover his debt obligations. It follows that
in this case the entrepreneur solves Problem I in section 2. Thus, it is straightforward to show that he will
borrow the maximum amount possible b = ¯ b and the temporary equilibrium will be the same as the one of
Proposition 1 for the case ψ ≥ ψ.
Suppose that an entrepreneur deviates and adopts a ‘safe borrowing policy’ that does not satisfy (7.23).
Under such a policy the entrepreneur will be able to repay his debt in the bad state. Thus, his expected
proﬁts are (note that ψs = 0)







Note that (7.22) and b/β ≤ p(εζw)l imply that b<¯ b(w). Since b<¯ b(w), the opportunity cost of capital
is 1 instead of 1 − βψ. Since the marginal product of risky capital has negative expected net present value
(i.e., αθg(l) <β ), it is optimal for the deviant to set k∗ =0 . It follows that the expected return on land is
composed only of capital gains. Thus, land purchases are positive only if




The left hand side is the expected return on land, while the right hand side is the safe return. Since ε<1, this













for any βζ ￿= 1. I tf o l l o w st h a ti fb/β ≤ p∗(εζw)l, it is optimal to store all wealth. Using the same arguments
as in section 2 we can show that since ψ ≥ ψ, expected proﬁts with s = w are not greater than with s =0 .
Therefore, deviating by adopting a safe borrowing policy does not yield higher expected proﬁts than the
equilibrium policy. ￿
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